Re: blocking ports at campus perimeter

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From: Ryan L. Means (rmeans_at_law.berkeley.edu)
Date: Fri Aug 01 2003 - 14:16:02 PDT

Greg,

This is the kind of mentality that permeates every corner of campus. "If
we can't do it perfectly, why do it at all?"

I think we all know that the only secure machine is one that's turned
off. For this particular situation, it's a question of minimizing risk.
If there is a machine on campus that is sourcing the attack, at least we
know who's doing it and where it's coming from. I also suggest that we
have a much better chance of tracking it down and pulling the plug.

Ryan

Greg Merritt wrote:

> At 1:51 PM -0700 8/1/03, Kevin D. Burney wrote:
>
>> Which is scarrier 30,000 possible attackers or 30,000,000.
>>
>
>
> I do see your point.
>
> On the flip side, what is the sufficient minimum number of attackers
> required to cause a problem? (The best answer a whole number between
> zero and two...)
>
> Sigh,
> -Greg
>
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-- 
Ryan L. Means
Chief Technical Officer
School of Law (Boalt Hall)
University of California, Berkeley
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